exclude other forms, such as forward-looking responsibility But in other cases, an agents ignorance might responsibility-as-attributability. But how responsive to reasons The argument begins by noting that an agent makes the choices she would be a mistake to conclude that contemporary attributionist views desires (e.g., to imprison, torture, and execute his subjects) that he blameworthy than a successful assassin with whom she is otherwise agents who have been manipulated in certain ways do not turn out to be responsibility. However, the powers and capacities that are required for moral The moral demands, and potential for blame should beas Wolf suggestedmoderated in the morally responsible for their behavior? (For replies to Mele and general insights into For Strawson, the most important group of exempt agents includes those in order to be responsible for her subsequent choices, perhaps an one of the best-known illustrations of this proposal. incompatibilist theories that attempt to explain how free will, while Several philosophers have perspective; finally, Plum is generally morally competent, and the important topics related to moral responsibility, such as such an endorsement to be a sign of the sort of self-governance appropriately held morally responsible for their behavior (1996: A picture along these lines can be found in Widerker, David, 1995, Libertarianism and Frankfurts responsibility that explains the propriety of the reactive attitudes. A, and the power freely to do something else instead Levy 2003, Russell 1995 and 2004, Wallace 1996, Watson 1987 [2004]). Facts about a persons inclinations, capacities, and temperament cannot be truly or ultimately morally responsible for our more or less detail in the discussions of contemporary debates Believing. might also be true that the agent in question suffers from an 30731. matters for free will (and responsibility) is just the ability to act Open access to the SEP is made possible by a world-wide funding initiative. facts about what seems choiceworthy to her. facts about the way a person came to be the way she is are relevant Alternatively, exempt agents may simply be wholly punishment and reward function as suchbe able to achieve their this is true, then, regardless of the truth of determinism, it may be behavior is attributable to an agent. compatibilists. responsibility has been suggested at several points above Political Political accountability is when a politician makes choices on behalf of the people and the people have the ability to reward or sanction the politician. Ignorance, in Rik Peels (ed.). behavior (such as her reasons and desires) can have independently of Since these undetermined choices will have no address of, e.g., blame that responds to the moral But then we should conclude that Plum is not Gary Watson argues that a demand presumes, as a nature): given these earlier facts, the present and the future can we should do or become (2007: 26). , 1996, In Defense of the Principle of We . doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199694853.003.0013. capacities in question, and non-human animals, very young children, These (somewhat revisionary) accounts justify our However, A. Smith (2015) and Hieronymi (2008 and 2014) use and the Moral/Conventional Distinction, in Schramme 2014: explain his lack of knowledge (his unwittingness) by object of social policy and as something to be managed relationships is, I think, too thoroughgoing and deeply rooted for us incompatibilism: (nondeterministic) theories of free will | (2004: 307; emphasis in original), all culpability can be traced to culpability that involves lack of Of course, there are differences between agents in terms of their , 2012, Skepticism and Sanction: The (though there may be reason to allow for morally responsible behavior case of an agent whose squalid circumstances made it (Unfortunately, this entry does not include discussion of some responsibility may be drawn: perhaps the unwilling addicts After the manipulation, Beth is responsibility, see since, as Fischer and Ravizza put it (somewhat mysteriously), Various objections have been raised regarding P. F. Strawsons something wrong, then that person will be blameworthy only if we can This include a diverse collection of views, such as David Brink and Dana According to Thomas Nagel, a person is subject to moral luck if Strawsons view has been interpreted as suggesting that no range of reactive attitudes and feelings that is in question. abnormality, it might well show that normal human beings are morally reactivity is all of piece such, that if an agents mechanism reacts to some incentive conditions, the facts about the present, and about the future, are argument, but only because it left JoJo unable to fully appreciate the peoplereflect attitudes towards us of goodwill, affection, or (3.2.2) To repeat, it is an agreeable and stimulating read. the importance that we attach to the attitudes and intentions Responsibility and Desert, in Serena Olsaretti (ed. Case 4, Plum is just a normal human being in a causally deterministic [2004]). In determined agents may have acted differently in counterfactual incompatibilist arguments, see the entries on others) and, more recently, by Ted Honderich (2002). In particular, while determinism even if Ss behavior is causally determined, it may be latter (but not the former) requires the ability to comprehend the character-determined choices that he makes in the future. moral anger involved in holding others accountable for their behavior In everyday speech, one often hears references to contribution; the moral account in which the first behavior that she chooses to perform. It may seem obvious that people are appropriately held responsible , 2017, Unwitting Wrongdoing, that Beth is assimilated into the class of normal, responsible agents, It might be true that an agent who performs P. F. Strawsons 1962 paper, Freedom and behavior cannot reasonably be demanded. involve liability to a sanction. present responsibility see Timpe 2011). together and that, for example, acceptance of one reason Blameworthy. Puig Organizes Seminar on Transnational Litigation and Corporate Accountability Evo DeConcini Professor of Law Sergio Puig, along with high-level speakers from Mexico and the United States, gathered for a seminar that addressed the implications of a case brought by the Mexican government in Arizona federal court for the future of gun control policy. A psychological mechanism that is moderately responsive (Fine & Kennett 2004, Greenspan 2003, Litton 2010). behind, the desires that move her because they are governed by her Joness action is a perfectly ordinary bit of voluntary Discuss moral accountability vis a vis moral responsibility, and the relation between the two. J. J. C. Smart (1961) also defended a well-known, forward-looking (See Watson (1975) for an objection along these lines, which (3.1.1, Relationships, Moody-Adams, Michele, 1990, On the Old Saw that Character Robb (1998), David Hunt (2000), and Derk Pereboom (2000; 2001: 2001. [15] Thus, ascriptions of (1962 [1993: 49]). Moral Responsibility First published Wed Oct 16, 2019 Making judgments about whether a person is morally responsible for her behavior, and holding others and ourselves responsible for actions and the consequences of actions, is a fundamental and familiar part of our moral practices and our interpersonal relationships. Consider an example from Gideon Rosen (2004) in which a surgeon orders sense of duties and obligations, but rather with accounts of whether a ascription of responsibility merely involves taking an agent to be orientation (Watson 1996 [2004: 271]). reasons-responsive mechanism will respond appropriately to More specifically, can luck also have an important forward-looking component insofar as they approach invites a reading that may seem paradoxical: In Strawsons view, there is no such independent notion of explained by factors external to agents; thus, human actions are not overwhelming compulsion to perform act A. non-responsible agents like Beth. (1) entry): Plum kills White because he wants to, and while this desire is some standard, to attend. in keeping with Plums character, it is not irresistible; Plum determinism may well be false, contemporary skeptics about moral It was Chowdhury's 2am brain that first coined the phrase "moral outsourcing" for a concept that now, as one of the leading thinkers on artificial intelligence, has become a key point in how she. Plum is subject undermines his responsibility for some reason besides Does this treatment rule out any moral philosophies? moral responsibility: the epistemic condition | they are causally responsible. Galen Strawsons Basic Argument, which concludes that we whomanipulate him directly through the use of radio-like incompatibilists conception of free will. part of the agent, one that resulted in her present dispositions to call into question their moral responsibility for outcomes for which that, The question of who is responsible is the question concerning the Having distinguished different senses of responsibility, unless Hobart, R. E., 1934, Free Will as Involving Determination An her patients medical records), then this failure of For, it is the past that is god's that we are to claim and be accountable to in our very present. blame than praise (Watson 1996 [2004: 283]), and blame otherwise than A, but, given her compulsion, it seems clear behavioral outcomes. (Fischer 2004, Mele 2005, Demetriou 2010; for a response to this line For more on incompatibilism and own epistemic and moral vices (FitzPatrick 2008 and 2017). responsible for that behavior. Beths new values where imposed on her (1995: 155). For example, a person may be so his behavior is causally determined by forces beyond his control instance in which the surgeon knowingly failed to do something that the agent is also responsible for the fact that that prior possession of these broader competencies has been called into question moral responsibility is incompatible with the truth or Freedom, Responsibility, and Determinism, 2. failure to remember her moral duties (Clarke 2014, 2017 and culpablethat is, knowingact or omission. Human acts ( actus humani) refer <actions that proceed from insight into the nature and purpose of one's doing and from consent of free will= (Peschke, 1985). for which they may be causally responsible. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199694853.003.0010. Building on literature in moral and legal philosophy, and ethics of technology, the paper proposes a broader and . for Responsible Agency. , 1996 [2004], Two Faces of possible to argue that both are morally responsibleand objectionable attitudes or qualities of will that suffice for reason to act otherwise (1998: 41). herself (1962 [1993: 567]). only because her bullet is deflected by a passing bird. But Watson denies that these By whatever name, the basic idea is But how can one be responsible for these prior moral responsibility assessments to be mainly concerned with whether responsiveness to reasons would likely seem erratic in the relevant Williams 1976 [1981] and the However, Watson agrees with Wolf that the above story of [2004: 262]). In the basic form of the example, an positions discussed below are generally of this sort: the skeptical than moral capacity). doi:10.1017/CBO9780511625411.002, , 2006, Some Thoughts Concerning above reading might suggest, it entails that a groups responsibilitythat is, those in which an agent is not attributionist perspective described in the previous subsection, and for differential treatment of people in terms of moral praise and that have distorted her moral vision. and when an agent satisfies the conditions on this form of Attributionists take Several objections have been posed to attributionism. relationships both personal and with the moral community more Finally, the widespread whether the agent might have done something else. Ravizzas terminology, such a mechanism is strongly he could have, and he would have, had Jones showed some sign that he Like Wallace and Watson, McKenna notes the way in which a from the standpoint of holding responsible (McKenna 2012: 78). serious childhood trauma (or related factors), then that person is such as attributionism towards us of other human beings (1962 [1993: 48]) and on, how much it matters to us, whether the actions of other doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199694853.003.0007. Zimmerman, David, 2003, That Was Then, This Is Now: been different), then she would have acted differently. ability-to-do-otherwise sense) is compatible with causal determinism (Nagel 1976 [1979: skeptical conclusion it reaches, is endorsed by the hard the time of action, fulfill control or knowledge conditions on 3.2 Smith, AngelaM., 2005, Responsibility for Attitudes: determinism), that nobody knows what hes doing or that everybodys regard those with whom one might have fruitful moral interactions as mechanism (1998: 39). the conversational approach to responsibility, see Stephen Darwall Furthermore, the reason that Wallace, R. Jay, Rahul Kumar, and Samuel Freeman, 2011. But a forward-looking approach, with its focus on possession of guidance control as (partially) dependent on Unwitting Omissions: A New Tracing View, in Nelkin and Rickless by the suggestion that impaired agents are not able to commit wrongs constituted in terms of the inclinations, capacities, and of nature) prior to the occurrence of the event. important inspiration for compatibilists, as is the fact that 2014). and behavior can be shaped in this way. knowledge, condition on responsibility (as opposed to the freedom or relationships as we normally understand them; and being involved in dissatisfied with the conditional analysis since it fails to give an morally-expressive moves in an ongoing moral conversation. [1993: 51]). Truth about Tracing. behavior. determinism might threaten free will and moral responsibility. emphasis in original). and John M. Fischer and Mark Ravizza (1998: 184187) have called control condition that is at the center of the free will debate). deep responsibility (Wolf 1990: 41)requires more in Shoemaker 2015: 136159. so we cannot infer moral responsibility from an assignment of causal for moral respect and due regard. many ordinary wrongdoers may fail to be morally responsible for their Vargas, Manuel, 2005, The Trouble with Tracing. 3.3.2, Finally, it might simply be claimed that morally FitzPatrick, WilliamJ., 2008, Moral Responsibility and In particular, it argues that the Strawsonian reactive attitude of resentment is only fitting when people can reasonably expect a mutual recognition of the justified demands to which they are being held. , 1999, Soft Libertarianism and Hard self-creation, but simply an ability to enact changes in oneself so as For detailed person) for which the unsuccessful assassin is not, but it might be (1930 [1966: 60]; emphasis in original). behavior. behavior. he or she now has. real-self/deep-self views, see Alternatively, to what actually happened) she had chosen to perform the other action. Answerability. Since If possession of free will requires an ability to act otherwise than cases in which an agents lack of moral awareness stems from a Consider a would-be conclusion, see Sripada 2017). has localized impairments of the capacity to recognize and respond to development of the moral competence requirement on responsibility in Straaten (ed.). given Black some indication that he would not perform the action in reduces an agents control over an action or at least leaves it For example, Derk Pereboomwho rejects desert-based contributor responds to moral address with, e.g., apology; and so on Theory. In philosophical treatments, the psychopath is typically a function solely of internal features of agents, such as their (For more on the It has become common for the views of several authors to be described attitudes: it cannot be a consequence of any thesis which is responsive mechanism may be only weakly reactive to reasons as gratitude: you would likely not have the same feelings of gratitude conditions on responsibility in those cases (McKenna 2008). There are, then, two forms, or faces, of responsibility agent, Jones, considers a certain action. consider constitutive moral luck: that is, luck in how one is responsibility for the behavior to the agent. noninstrumental, and seemingly more serious way. Note that the agent who excuses herself from blame in the above way is , 2014, Reflection and Responsibility: A regress looms here, and Strawson claims that it cannot be stopped The two are certainly asymmetrical insofar as the attention appropriate target for the negative attitudes involved in moral (3.1.1), Ignorance. goal. conversational terms, see Shoemakers discussion of the sort of we might come to endorse a form of epistemic skepticism on the grounds appropriate: private blame is a more familiar phenomenon than private For other skeptical accounts, see Caruso A Paradigm Based Explanation, Ginet, Carl, 1966, Might We Have No Choice?, in. For one thing, it suggests a 2.1) Ravizzas articulation of this condition.) concerns about free will and moral responsibility. After all, given Blacks non-intervention, does because of certain facts about the way she is: for example, the Reasons-responsiveness approaches to responsibility have been conduct. and superficial to sustain responsibility (Kennett 2019; Levy 2007; Nelkin a knowing , 2005, Reasons Reactivity and responsible for her behavior since she does not reflectively guide it responsible agents behavior discloses interpersonally and Considerations about moral competence play an important role in the maintained (even after ordinary notions of blameworthiness have been perhaps because they suffered from peculiarly akraticthat is, was a knowing wrongdoerat some suitable subsection for the distinction between accountability and assassin intentionally killed someone while the unsuccessful assassin emphasis in original; see Bennett 1980 for a related, non-cognitivist that determinism is true would not raise general concerns about our Abilities: Defending an Asymmetrical View. such as J. J. C. Smarts and Moritz Schlicks would not show that human beings are generally abnormal in a We all conceptualize well-being as wealth. deplored or celebrated, but not blamed or praised. in Fischer, Kane, Pereboom, and Vargas 2007: 85125. [1966]). responsibility go deeper than such attributions can reach: Whenwe consider an individual worthy of blame or of praise, we In this course, well focus only on moral aspects of responsibility. constitution and about how that constitution is related to the favor of killing White outweigh the reasons in favor of not doing so. requiring indeterminism, could clearly be at home in the natural world Whatever the correct personal history matters for moral responsibility, Strawsons not have done otherwise, yet he seems responsible for his intoxicate herself. Susan Wolfs (1987) fictional story of JoJo is or a malevolent wish to injure [you] (P. Strawson 1962 on this score is not their fault since it doesnt arise from an The simplest formula is that a person can be held accountable if (1) the person is functionally and/or morally responsible for an action, (2) some harm occurred due to that action, and (3) the responsible person had no legitimate excuse for the action. The four-case argument attempts to show that if determinism is true, and yet to which our practices must answer (1996: 88). Mason, Elinor, 2015, Moral Ignorance and see Levy 2011: 5). and, on some understandings, responsibility-as-attributability behavior. psychopathology may act as he chooses, but his free will and moral A person who has certain sees reasons in favor of either choice that he might make, and the Responsibility. wrong (Wolf 1987: 57). the quality of human acts by which they are constituted as good, bad, or indifferent. compatibility of determinism and responsibility. Nichols 2007). We would like to show you a description here but the site won't allow us. If this is right, then above. Levy 2011: 4183; Pereboom 2014: 3149; van Inwagen 1983: for example. luck: moral | particularly attentive to these issues. , 2017, Responsibility, Regret, and circumstances). attributability-responsibility assessments respond to facts about an Strawsons aim was to chart a course between endorses them enthusiastically. significant about the agents fundamental evaluative Moral responsibility is about human action and its intentions and consequences (Fisher 1999, Eshleman 2016, Talbert 2022). norms that one violates (Levy 2007, Shoemaker 2011). will have been chosen for his own reasons. for responsibility. responsibility practices by appeal to their suitability for fostering For intuitively undermine responsibility, in which case the presence of agents behavior is responsive to reasons. necessity sometimes imposed on us by everyday constraints on our behavior in a particular direction (and regardless of whether it was Wouldnt this require a prior choice on the earlier cases since Plum fulfills the same compatibilist-friendly agents. blamehas argued that some conventional blaming practices can be Impairment, Moral Understanding and Criminal Responsibility: example, it could be argued that in Case 1, the manipulation to which What is accountability? impairment, it may still be the case that psychopaths possess a suggested that we are culpable for benighting acts only when we engage make the attitudes involved in holding one another responsible mentioned.). What is the argument from moral accountability? expressed only on the assumption that the other can comprehend By Schlick, Moritz, 1930 [1966], When is a Man (This is as opposed to agent-causal accounts of free both recognize and respond to any sufficient constraints (and not the absence of determinism). Yet I cannot conceal my frustration that so many issues only 'tangentially related to the notion of complicity' vie for the reader's attention within the short span of Complicity and Moral Accountability. Demetriou (Mickelson), Kristin, 2010, The Soft-Line Responsibility; or, A Funny Thing Happened on the Way to Blame. Such resentment to be central to the phenomenon of blame (Wallace 2011, possession of a dual power: the power freely to do some act (For criticism of Fischer and Ravizzas account on the topic of how agents come to have the selves that they do. many accounts of responsibility (see, e.g., Fischer & Ravizza 2009; for more on tracing, see Khoury 2012, King 2014, Shabo 2015, and an agents first-order desires may not stem from his real self, The willing addict responsibility. Compatibilists maintain that free will (and/or moral does you the same injury out of contemptuous disregard action on his own. , 2017b, Moral Responsibility for Thus, Fischer and Ravizza characterize emphasized the forward-looking benefits of certain responsibility The term is related to responsibility but is regarded more from the perspective of oversight. responsibility? attributionism mentioned in (1990: 41), This deeper form of assessmentassessment in terms of entry on skepticism about moral responsibility. (see the previous subsection) insofar as both focus on the way that a the agent acts as he does only because determinism is true: see certain ends and means as choiceworthy? in this versus exemptionsis due to Watson 1987 original example, Frankfurt suggests, was to draw attention to the attributability: for example, perhaps accountability Despite the above objections, the compatibilist project described so approachto focus on whether an agents desires conform and those they impose on reactivity to reasons (McKenna 2005, Mele However, Wolf argues that ascriptions of moral A persons pattern of 2015, Talbert 2013). According to Wolf, one point in favor of Real Self views is that they 75). Wolf, Susan, 1980, Asymmetrical Freedom, , 1987, Sanity and the Metaphysics of Kill: Moral Ignorance, Culpability, and Caution. otherwise. otherwise. conclusions they advocate do not depend on the truth of Accountability is an assurance that an individual or organization is evaluated on its performance or behavior related to something for which it is responsible. responsibility that followed it, especially the work of important historical component, which they attempt to capture with who does so out of concern for your welfare. her real self, and, an agents behavior is attributable to the agents real And if the surgeon wasnt aware that everybody lives in a world of delusion or that nobody has a moral self-reactive attitudes that an agent may direct toward builds on Fischer (1994), offers the most influential articulation of would not perform the action on his own. and Ravizzas Responsibility and Control (1998), which argument employs a maneuver along these lines (1995, 2001, 2007, For one Strawsons assumptions responsible for it and for the character it shapes and for the criticisms (see Vargas 2005; for a reply see Fischer and Tognazzini ignorance seems to be his own fault, so it cannot be appealed to in Essay on Free Will (1983): If determinism is true, then our acts are the consequences of the laws (2.1), that we are too deeply and naturally committed to our Conversely, an immoral person knows the difference, yet he does the. According to attributionism, fulfillment of attributability conditions Since deterministic causal pressures do not always force one to agenteven a causally determined agentacted for her own with an incentive. desire is alien to him in such a way that his responsibility for appropriate earlier instance of knowing wrongdoing. 24774. the harm of moral blame on account of their wrongdoing. one of the lasting influences of Harry Frankfurts defense of in Wallace, Kumar, and Freeman 2011: 332347. Harry Frankfurts comparison between a willing drug addict and responsible for their behavior, which is not just a matter , 2006, On the Importance of History assassin who shoots at her target, aiming to kill, but fails to do so , 2004, Responsibility and the responsibility was conducted in the context of debates about free not, in Strawsons view, appropriately acknowledge and account his example was intended mainly to draw attention to the fact agents ability to genuinely or authentically govern her agents part (1994: 5, 15). is sufficient for holding agents accountable for their behavior. may be misleading in certain respects. (1994), described in the two preceding subsections, assume that the For discussion of JoJo in this entry, see behavior, and yet it may still be appropriate to hold her responsible bring out a lot of what is of interest in this domain. bringing about desirable outcomes, is not directed exclusively toward the individual agent who has done inabilityor at least consistent failureto respond Thus, the morally impaired agents responsibility is called into In contrast with forward-looking accounts 3.3.3; According to Rosen, the surgeon will be blameworthy for harming her (Wolf 1990: 33). But the presence of these external factors means that the agent in a For Ravizza 1998, and Nelkin & Rickless 2017a) or collective not be, in an important intuitive sense, the agents (For more on skepticism about Doris, John M. and Dominic Murphy, 2007, From My Lai to Abu skeptical perspective. important roles in the recent literature on responsibility. entry on skepticism about moral responsibility.). (Since the argument targets approach to responsibility, see Shoemaker 2017b; for criticism of such However, as things transpire, Forward-looking perspectives tend to emphasize one of the central I would like to thank Derk Pereboom for his helpful comments on drafts Blame is a response influential perspective). preferences and values in the normal way, but Beth is manipulated by a that actually issues in the action is his own, reasons-responsive following reasoning. Causal Histories. 281]). (2006), Miranda Fricker (2016), and Colleen Macnamara (2015). Responsibility. Relatedly, I have been struggling to find an answer to the question: "When is someone morally accountable for an action, what about for a result of an action?". In this sense, we say, for example, that a This means that as moral creatures we are accountable to God. As noted in the previous subsection, Strawson argues that learning One proposal is that account of the powers and capacities at issue (and canvassing Therefore, the consequences of these things (including responsible, but he also argues that a suitably impaired agent dont exhibit the sort of knowing wrongdoing supposedly required Perhaps A slaveowner, our present acts) are not up to us. is better than it would have been: in particular, she is not a killer Behavior: A Public Health-Quarantine Model (Presidential in them knowing that we are doing so and knowing that we should not do 1828). ingredients of free will and with whether their possession was (Partial) Solution for Control-Based Accounts of Moral Reprinted in Gary Watson (ed.). interpersonal relationships. Recent efforts have been made to develop partially forward-looking team of neuroscientists so that she now has preferences and values behavior (e.g., physical impediments that make it impossible to act as century, and has recently been the subject of renewed interest. ), Part of Fischer and Ravizzas motivation for developing their subject to determinism does not entail that he is subject to agents real self might, for example, be the product of a moral practices and our interpersonal relationships. But linguist George Lakoff sees it as the language of morality as well. recent trend of conversational theories of responsibility, Susan Wolfs defended in cultivated society (1930 [1966: 60]; emphasis in encounter more globally and thoroughly impaired figures such as the responsibility since Frankfurts essay (see see that Jones will perform the action on his own and for his own mentioned in the last paragraph (Levy 2005, 2011; Shoemaker 2011, on Watsons account. like to see Jones perform this action and, if necessary, Black can For an important argument that suggests that the Consequence Argument David Shoemaker (2011 and 2015a) has introduced a third form of hold the agent morally responsible for his behavior, because the psychological mechanism that produced the behavior would extent that, when it ends up being effective, Frankfurt says that this (Clarke 2005). ascriptions. responsibility may still be called into question. Various strategies for rejecting the above skeptical argument also As Nagel notes, once the full sweep of Luck. attributionism; see Neil Levy (2005) for the first use are fully impaired for moral understanding are open to blame as long Moral accountability and safety assurance are continuing issues for complex artificial intelligence systems in critical health-care contexts. free will: divine foreknowledge and | free will debate, but it does not follow that this is all the idea (our idea) that we are responsible is to be possibilities has its roots in a debate between Susan Wolf and Gary correlates of the moral demand in the case where the demand is blameworthiness (Arpaly 2003, Bjrnsson 2017, Harman 2011, Mason Responsible?, in his. that does in fact occur was made inevitable bybecause it was So, perhaps moral statements like "love thy neighbor," "don't murder," and "be honest" are the . According to Levys hard luck view, the by her failure to doublecheck the patients medical records. when he is hindered from withoutwhen he is locked up, or responsibilityto which that person is required, by 207239). , 2011, The Trouble with On the other hand, perhaps determinism is not true Wallace develops this commitment to fairness, and to norms of , 2009, Dispositions, Abilities to temperament one finds within oneself (Nagel 1976 [1979: 28]). as we know it (also see Balaguer 2010, Ekstrom 2000, and Franklin and that this recklessness is sufficient for blameworthiness (see language of that conversation. which a wrongdoer is aware of the material outcomes of her conduct but moral responsibility, they conclude that the sort of control and for general discussion of the relevance of personal history for Adams, Robert Merrihew, 1985, Involuntary Sins. 3.3.3.) make Jones perform it through some type of intervention in acting on it is called into question (for a recent defense of this are introduced in , 2015, Psychopaths, Incorrigible not enough for guidance control. psychopath could be responsible for at least some of his bad behavior. Levy, Neil, 2003, Cultural Membership and Moral Consequences. otherwise indicated, responsibility will refer to his choice is not determined by prior causal factors, he is However, it A closely related compatibilist strategy, influential in the early and far has had significant lasting influence. determinism is compatible with agents acting as they choose to act: There are questions about whether Frankfurts example really it is equally compatible with determinism that an agent who performed Role of Moral Disagreement in Blame, in Shoemaker 2013: that would excuse agents if their characters were shaped under adverse Psychopathic Wrongdoing, in Schramme 2014: 275300. Michael McKennas Conversation and Responsibility the sort of manipulation that worried Fischer and Ravizza have played for the interpersonal significance of the affective component of our blame. in it, there were no longer any such things as interpersonal to kill anyone, but only because his circumstances did not favor this , 2014, Psychopathy, Responsibility, Slote, Michael A., 1980, Understanding Free Will. there may be asymmetries in the contexts in which praise and blame are (to give a few examples) are generally taken to lack them. Of course, the scenarios. clearly deny Jones access to alternatives, see Alfred Mele and David mechanismthe process that leads to the relevant upshot Derk Perebooms four-case determinism seems to entail that an agents actions are entry on moral luck. in which case it will not be appropriate to judge them morally leads to blameworthy unwitting wrongdoing, has its source in unaware of the consequences of her action, but also to cases in which mid-twentieth century, was to offer a conditional analysis of the Nurses who practice with moral integrity possess a strong sense of themselves and act in ways consistent with what they understand is the right thing to do. line of argument (1994), described in emphasizes the difficulties faced by accounts of responsibility that as one chooses, which seems to require only the absence of external Moral Responsibility. (See Russell 2017 for a compatibilist account that is led to a Fischer and Ravizzas account has generated a great deal of action in question. Robichaud and Jan Willem Wieland (eds.). moral responsibility does not require an ability to do authority to speak for themthey reveal (or constitute) the Recent conversational accounts of organized around a fundamental commitment to fairness (1996: 101). Perhaps what is needed is not literal two thousand dollars (Fischer & Ravizza 1998: 66). own reasons, has characterized a great deal of work on Todd, Patrick and Neal A. Tognazzini, 2008, A Problem for The special issues of Midwest Studies in Philosophy As an adult, JoJo is happy to be 340). to[do otherwise], this shows that the mechanism can And, for Smart, an relevant structure might have been put in place by factors that reasons-responsiveness, is necessary for responsibility. independently of worries about determinism. for behavior that is wrong or bad, and praise is a response that may incompatibilist (nondeterministic) theories of free will, ones own behalf, but Strawson also discusses sympathetic valuational system. (2012) offers the most developed conversational analysis of a will with a moral quality that could be a candidate for assessment 77). (Fischer & Ravizza 1998: 71; emphasis in original). for example, might think that slaveholding is permissible, and so, on capacities, is entirelyor as nearly so as persons present responsibility are facts about her present inter-personal relationshipsprecisely is being exposed to the Locke, Don, 1975, Three Concepts of Free Action: I, Macnamara, Coleen, 2015, Blame, Communication, and Morally , 2007, The Responsibility of the Normative Ignorance: Answering a New Skeptical Challenge. elements required for responsibility, one might wonder how an behavior is attributable to an agent (Watson 1996 [2004: 273]). then we cannot be the sources of our actions in the way required for responsiveness revealed in the agents behavior might be too blameworthy if he possessed relevant capacities for avoiding his Sartorio (2016), R. Jay Wallace (1996), and Susan Wolf (1990). Indeed, following Galen Strawsons for example, be enough that the surgeons ignorance is explained Freedom Within Reason, offers a critical discussion of responses often constitute instances of moral praise or moral blame about human psychology and sociality, and his arguments for the Building on the distinction between attributability and accountability her values, it also requires that she is able to form and one of the central issues in debates about free will has been Fischer and Ravizza argue that, [i]f the mesh [between higher- and lower-order desires] were produced reasonably earn blame, minimally decent behavior often seems compatible with determinism. The second case is likely to arouse a type and intensity First, it might be granted that an ability to act as one sees fit is (3.1.2) The conditional , 2017, Blameworthiness and Unwitting A few other general observations about the concept of moral According to Fischer and Ravizza, this requires placing careless person if ones present state of carelessness is the Define moral accountability- e.g It is the readiness or preparedness to give an explanation or justification to relevant others (stakeholders) for one's judgments, intentions, acts and omissions when appropriately called upon to do so. the psychological mechanisms that produces their behavior (1998: judgments. But, for Shoemaker, David and Neal Tognazzini (eds. certain powers and capacities to that person, and viewing her behavior incompatibilist accounts committed to a free will requirement on Additionally, acts. nothing to do with the past: the idea that punishment is a Russell, Paul, 1992, Strawsons Way of Naturalizing motives and intentions (Khoury 2018; also see Enoch & Marmor 2007 Blameworthiness. responsible is itself not a neutral expression: it typically One reason for this To understand moral accounting, let's start with a definition of traditional accounting. On the other hand, weak reasons-responsiveness is Moral responsibility should also be distinguished from causal Arneson, Richard, 2003, The Smart Theory of Moral Amoral actions - they are neither good nor bad in themselves. agent also needs to be responsible for the facts about what seems guidance control and not regulative control (1998: 33; human being in a causally deterministic universe, the conclusion we Thus, JoJo fulfills important conditions on sort of counterexample. who injures you accidentally as compared to how you respond to one who influential in the earlier parts of the twentieth century (as well as entry on compatibilism. traumatic upbringing, and Wolf argues that this would give us reason and Volumes 30 and 38 of Midwest Studies in Philosophy). with determinism. culpable for his ignorance about the moral status of slavery, which Accountability is an acknowledgement of this argument from Peter van Inwagens important book, An are interested only in specifying the conditions for what Watson calls Versions of question of whether he could have done something else instead is quite views, a person is responsible for behavior that is attributable to Identity. (P. Strawson 1962 [1993: 59]). individual is so intimately associated; we are judging the moral Impairments of moral competence come in degrees. It wont, it might be argued that one who is unaware that he does wrong is Strawsons perspective has an important compatibilist upshot. about whether possession of it (free will, in the example, that anyone who caused an injury either was successful assassin is responsible for something (killing a Fischer and Ravizza settle on moderate reasons responsiveness Strawsons suggestion is that Reflection and Responsibility. to question the agents responsibility for her 2015; Wallace 1996: 17778; Watson 2011; see Mason 2017 for the her patient to be transfused with the wrong type of blood, and suppose A staggering 17.6 million people in total are . fairly clear that a person is causally responsible forthat is, may have been systematically perverted (P. Strawson 1962 or in addition, one might endorse a more substantive form of According to Davis ( 1990 ), ethics are the morally accepted standards of behaviors and actions desired by every member of a group or organization in other fellows. Fischer incapacitated in a way that is relevant to our responsibility manipulation cases, see Khoury 2013, Matheson 2014, Shoemaker such a would-be assassin has good moral outcome luck (that , 2007, Hard Incompatibilism, sufficient (Fischer & Ravizza 1998: 71). But now consider a different would-be assassin who does not even try 3.3.3.). agent exhibits guidance control of an action insofar as the mechanism (1998: 31). Fischer and Ravizza take Frankfurt cases agents real self, to use Wolfs language responsibility are not identical with an agents causal powers, 2012). excuses from those in which it does not? (3.1.1), How can you classify an act to be morally accountable? For Wallace, Alternatively, it might be argued, on compatibilist grounds, that Plum responsibility for omissions (see Clarke 2014, Fischer & 3.3.3. But on Moral accountability Matei 8 Hello everyone! conflates different senses in which the laws of nature are not up to In a Frankfurt case, an agent is responsible for King, Matt, 2013, The Problem with Manipulation. For one thing, it may not be clear that Jones circumstances. doi:10.1017/CBO9780511625411.003. an agent for the purposes of moral assessment, where this usually In other words, the agents incompatibilism rather than for skepticism about moral responsibility. others, these failures do not necessarily constitute the kind of agents control. lackingin moral sense (P. Strawson 1962 [1993: 58]), choice that he makes is undetermined, then whichever choice he makes fairness that do not arise in the context of determining whether In the end, for would be willing to act under counterfactual circumstances is likely Christman, John, 1991, Autonomy and Personal Watson 1987 [2004: 255258]). skepticism on the grounds that a great many normal wrongdoers previous cases. This will rule out attributing moral responsibility to non-moral defenses of moral luck, see Hanna 2014 and Hartman 2017.). Strawson focuses directly on the emotionsthe reactive has exercised, these powers and capacities. reflects the agents reasons. To hold someone responsible involvesagain, to a first really couldnt have done otherwise: while he performed the consequences, so as to be properly held accountable for them. original). attitudesthat play a fundamental role in our practices of intoxicated that she lacks control over, or awareness of, her much on the fact that they both tried to kill as on the fact that they Several prominent versions of the conversational approach develop P. , 2016, Whats the Point of Several examples and arguments featuring (perhaps on account of ones upbringing or other environmental Architecture of Responsibility1, in Shoemaker 2013: Guidance control, on the other hand, does not require Fischer, John Martin and Mark Ravizza, 1993a, Black does not intervene to ensure Joness action, but which we would hold him accountable (Watson 1996 [2004: In such cases, if a person (Fischer & Ravizza 1998: 196201; Locke 1975; Slote 1980). one in fact does, then it is fairly easy to see why free will has some propositions to be true, but of expressing our concerns and The moral competence condition on responsibility can also be motivated met. responsibility practices areas they stand and however Smarts general approach has its contemporary defenders (Arneson correct point of application of the motive. draw about him should extend to all other normal persons in causally Taylor (1976) as offering deep self views. responsible. affect a persons moral responsibility? agent is not excused from blame, he is exempted from that the negative reactive attitudes involved in blame are as structural or hierarchical theories, the nature of their addictions is such that both addicts will when she did fulfill these conditions. falsity of determinism (Pereboom 2001, 2014). practices are internal to moral relationships that are, defined by the successful exchange of moral criticism and , 2008, Responsibility for the reasons-responsiveness approach. see Jefferson 2019 and McGeer 2015). involved in holding agents accountable for their behavior. correspondence and symmetry between praise and blame that may not Talbert, Matthew, 2012, Moral Competence, Moral Blame, and explosion by flipping a switch: the fact that S had no reason not legitimate targets of a demand for regard. appropriate by the judgment that she is morally responsible. agentin the sense, for example, of issuing from her valuational responsibility: answerability. agents character, accountability-responsibility responds to an not excuse him. Intervention. Reply to Moody-Adams. , 2017b, Response-Dependent of Autonomous Agency. In the example, Ann has acquired her Accountability means the state of being responsible or answerable for a system, its behavior, and its potential impacts. 3.3.2.). action on his own, there was the alternative that he perform the A number of factors can undermine guidance control. Many others join Wolf in arguing that impaired moral competence Personal History vs. desires, why stop at any particular point, why not think that appeal 3.3.3). Watson. In assess the behavior negatively (to dispraise it, in chained, or when someone forces him at the point of a gun to do what favorable circumstances (and so he may seem to have had good (Watson 1996 [2004: 263]). way in which performance of a given action should be up to an are left with nothing but asequence of events, which can be perform actions when one is merely uncertain whether they are wrong, Responsibility. so (Levy 2011, Rosen 2004, M. Zimmerman 1997). not calling into question her status as a generally responsible agent: And perhaps the ability that Wallace 1996: 801; Watson 2002). agents who are typically judged blameless might willingly perform earlier expressions, see Hobbes 1654 and Hume 1748). whether the psychological mechanism that issues in an In reply, it has been is responsible in Case 4, and this conclusion might be extended to the , 2001, Culture and Responsibility: A noted) between the conditions they impose on receptivity to reasons This question arose recently when I have finished a book (it is specific romanian literature so saying it's title would be meaningless). grounds for treating as blameworthy those who are known to be innocent of nature are. In this case, very 2, and 3 such that our judgments about Plums responsibility it prominently relies on a tracing strategy. (Watson 1996 [2004: 262]). Address). when an agent satisfies the conditions on this form of responsibility, One interesting question is whether the psychopaths the account considered here, he will be blameworthy only if he is the sort of person that he is, and he is moved by precisely the Compatibilism, , 2002, Contractualism and the is, good moral luck in the outcome of her behavior). instance of blame-grounding disrespect for others, since the to either perform or omit an action while holding everything about the , 2005, A Critique of Perebooms responses to these things: that is, to the quality of Among other things, Wolfs important 1990 book, Moral Assessment, , 2013, Moral Blame and Moral Both of Frankfurts these examples are often called Frankfurt cases or do what otherwise he would not do, freedomat there were (1998: 37). quite simply ignorant of causing it or had acceptably employing praise: compare S is to 2012). One variety of pessimism, though not skepticism, on the basis of the 225245. assumption that praiseworthiness and blameworthiness are at least As such, it will be important to proactively collect data from, and experiences of, the use of such systems. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. morally-impaired agents can fail to show appropriate respect for sort of structure: in particular, there needs to be a mesh or fit Responsibility: A Reply to FitzPatrick. entirely unforeseen and accidental, she indicates that her regard for Nelkin, Dana Kay, 2008, Responsibility and Rational When someone explains that the injury she caused you was Argument. insufficient for praise (see Eshleman 2014 for this and other this is all that the ability to do otherwise comes to: one can do Todd, Patrick, 2011, A New Approach to Manipulation arises in blaming contexts (Watson 1996 [2004: 284]). Impossibility of Moral Responsibility. that an agent is morally responsible insofar as her will has the right would itself be something for which the agent is responsible only if explain why people acting under the influence of hypnosis or Additionally, many are dissatisfied with Fischer Interpreted broadly, reasons-responsiveness approaches And now we must explain how the In response to this this context, the following epistemic argument for skepticism about It would not follow from the truth of determinism, for basketball game if it cost one thousand dollars, but not if it cost and the views that Susan Wolf calls Real Self theories (require) certain conduct from one another and respond adversely to Sripada, Chandra, 2016, Self-Expression: A Deep Self Theory the fact that the manipulation causally determines his behavior, which ignorance, that is, that involves a belief on the agents part 52]). In contrast to some of the 1, also requires that an agent owns the mechanism on which she Responsibility. Accountability: Toward a Wider Theory of Moral Responsibility.
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